What is Enlightenment? (1784)
何謂啟蒙?
Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's understanding without guidance from another. This immaturity is self-imposed when its cause lies not in lack of understanding, but in lack of resolve and courage to use it without guidance from another. Sapere Aude! [dare to know] "Have courage to use your own understanding!"--that is the motto of enlightenment.
啟蒙就是人類從自我造成的不成熟狀態中解脫出來。不成熟是指缺少他人的教導就沒有能力運用自己的理智。這種不成熟狀態之所以是自我造成的,其原因不在於缺少理智,而在於沒有他人的教導就缺乏運用自己理智的決心和勇氣。Sapere Aude! [要勇於認知] “要有勇氣運用你自己的理智!” —— 這就是啟蒙運動的格言。
Laziness and cowardice are the reasons why so great a proportion of men, long after nature has released them from alien guidance (natura-liter maiorennes), nonetheless gladly remain in lifelong immaturity, and why it is so easy for others to establish themselves as their guardians. It is so easy to be immature. If I have a book to serve as my understanding, a pastor to serve as my conscience, a physician to determine my diet for me, and so on, I need not exert myself at all. I need not think, if only I can pay: others will readily undertake the irksome work for me. The guardians who have so benevolently taken over the supervision of men have carefully seen to it that the far greatest part of them (including the entire fair sex) regard taking the step to maturity as very dangerous, not to mention difficult. Having first made their domestic livestock dumb, and having carefully made sure that these docile creatures will not take a single step without the go-cart to which they are harnessed, these guardians then show them the danger that threatens them, should they attempt to walk alone. Now this danger is not actually so great, for after falling a few times they would in the end certainly learn to walk; but an example of this kind makes men timid and usually frightens them out of all further attempts.
人類中之所以還有如此眾多的人,即使自然早已將他們從疏離的外在教導中解脫出來(因自然方式而成熟),卻依然心甘情願地終身安處於不成熟狀態之中,其原因就在於懶惰和怯懦,這也是為什麼另一些人能夠輕而易舉地把自己標舉為他們的監護者。處於不成熟狀態可真是輕鬆安逸啊。如果我有一本書來充作我自己的見解、有一位牧師來充作我自己的良心、有一名醫生來替我自己決定合理的食飲,等等等等諸如此類的,那我又何必要自己勞心費神,那完全沒有必要了。我無需思考,只需要有能力支付:其他人就會欣然應命幫我把那些傷腦筋的討厭活兒全都包辦了。仁慈慷慨地擔負起治理民眾之任的監護者們小心翼翼地看護著,以確保民眾中的絕大部分人(其中包括全部的女性)視通往成熟之路為畏途,充滿了風險,更別說困難重重了。在首先使他們馴養的牲口緘默無聲之後,在確信這些溫順的生靈們即使被撤去拴縛在身上的絡轡也不會再挪移一步之時,一旦它們試圖想要獨自邁步,這些監護者們就會向它們指出種種的威脅。這危險現在看來實際上並沒有那麼嚴重,因為在跌倒幾次之後,人們最終一定能夠學會自己走路的;但諸如此類的示例卻讓人們心生膽怯,通常就會把他們進一步嘗試的所有企圖全都嚇退了。
Thus, it is difficult for any individual man to work himself out of the immaturity that has all but become his nature. He has even become fond of this state and for the time being is actually incapable of using his own understanding, for no one has ever allowed him to attempt it. Rules and formulas, those mechanical aids to the rational use, or rather misuse, of his natural gifts, are the shackles of a permanent immaturity. Whoever threw them off would still make only an uncertain leap over the smallest ditch, since he is unaccustomed to this kind of free movement. Consequently, only a few have succeeded, by cultivating their own minds, in freeing themselves from immaturity and pursuing a secure course.
因此,對於任何一個個體而言,要把自身從那種幾乎已經變成他自己天性的不成熟狀態中解脫出來是困難的。他甚至已經開始喜歡上這種狀態了,並且在這個時候,的的確確無力運用他自己的理智,因為從未有人允許他去作過這樣的嘗試。條例和規程,這些基於他的自然稟賦的理性運用或更像是誤用的機械刻板的工具,把他禁錮在永久的不成熟狀態中。即使有誰拋開這些禁錮,那也不過是作了一次遊移不定而又微乎其微的跳躍,因為他並不習慣于這樣的自由行動。其結果就是,僅有少數一些人取得了成功,通過陶冶他們自己的心智,把他們自己從不成熟狀態中解救出來,從而踏上一條切實堅信的道路。
But that the public should enlighten itself is more likely; indeed, if it is only allowed freedom, enlightenment is almost inevitable. For even among the entrenched guardians of the great masses a few will always think for themselves, a few who, after having themselves thrown off the yoke of immaturity, will spread the spirit of a rational appreciation for both their own worth and for each person's calling to think for himself. But it should be particularly noted that if a public that was first placed in this yoke by the guardians is suitably aroused by some of those who are altogether incapable of enlightenment, it may force the guardians themselves to remain under the yoke--so pernicious is it to instill prejudices, for they finally take revenge upon their originators, or on their descendants. Thus a public can only attain enlightenment slowly. Perhaps a revolution can overthrow autocratic despotism and profiteering or power-grabbing oppression, but it can never truly reform a manner of thinking; instead, new prejudices, just like the old ones they replace, will serve as a leash for the great unthinking mass.
然而,如果公眾要啟蒙自己,那卻更有可能;事實上,公眾即使僅被賦予了自由,啟蒙就幾乎是無可避免的了。因為即使在那些根深節錯的群氓監護者們中間,一些人也總是會自己獨立進行思考的,一些人在他們自己擺脫了不成熟狀態的羈絆後,將會傳揚理性評估他們自身價值、並且理性評估每一個人受其天性召喚進行獨立思考的那種精神。但需要特別指出的是,如果原本被監護者束縛羈絆的公眾是被一群未能經受啟蒙思想洗禮的人煽動起來的,他們就可能會使用暴力強制把監護者們自己禁錮在羈絆中 —— 種下偏見可真是太有害了,因為它們最終會將復仇引向其始作俑者,亦或他們的後代。因此,公眾只能通過緩慢漸進的方式經受啟蒙洗禮。也許一場革命能夠推翻個人專制、貪欲或權勢欲的壓迫,但革命永遠無法帶來思想方式的真正變革;相反,新的偏見,一如它們所取代的舊偏見,又將成為套在不進行獨立思考的群氓身上的一條皮項圈。
Nothing is required for this enlightenment, however, except freedom; and the freedom in question is the least harmful of all, namely, the freedom to use reason publicly in all matters. But on all sides I hear: "Do not argue!" The officer says, "Do not argue, drill!" The tax man says, "Do not argue, pay!" The pastor says, "Do not argue, believe!" (Only one ruler in the World says, "Argue as much as you want and about what you want, but obey!") In this we have examples of pervasive restrictions on freedom.
啟蒙所需要的,不是別的,僅僅是自由;並且我們這裡所討論的自由也是所有形式中最不具有危害性的,亦即能夠在一切事務上公開地運用理性的自由。但是,環顧周遭我聽見的卻是 “不許爭辯!” 軍官說:“不許爭辯,只管操練!” 稅務官說:“不許爭辯,只管納稅!” 牧師說:“不許爭辯,只管相信!” (世上只有一位君主[注:腓德烈大王]說過:“隨你所願儘管去爭辯吧,爭什麼都可以,但是必須服從!” 在這種種事例中,我們看見對自由的限制無所不在。
But which restriction hinders enlightenment and which does not, but instead actually advances it? I reply: The public use of one's reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among mankind; the private use of reason may, however, often be very narrowly restricted, without otherwise hindering the progress of enlightenment. By the public use of one's own reason I understand the use that anyone as a scholar makes of reason before the entire literate world. I call the private use of reason that which a person may make in a civic post or office that has been entrusted to him. Now in many affairs conducted in the interests of a community, a certain mechanism is required by means of which some of its members must conduct themselves in an entirely passive manner so that through an artificial unanimity the government may guide them toward public ends, or at least prevent them from destroying such ends. Here one certainly must not argue, instead one must obey. However, insofar as this part of the machine also regards himself as a member of the community as a whole, or even of the world community, and as a consequence addresses the public in the role of a scholar, in the proper sense of that term, he can most certainly argue, without thereby harming the affairs for which as a passive member he is partly responsible. Thus it would be disastrous if an officer on duty who was given a command by his superior were to question the appropriateness or utility of the order. He must obey. But as a scholar he cannot be justly constrained from making comments about errors in military service, or from placing them before the public for its judgment. The citizen cannot refuse to pay the taxes imposed on him; indeed, impertinent criticism of such levies, when they should be paid by him, can be punished as a scandal (since it can lead to widespread insubordination). But the same person does not act contrary to civic duty when, as a scholar, he publicly expresses his thoughts regarding the impropriety or even injustice of such taxes. Likewise a pastor is bound to instruct his catecumens and congregation in accordance with the symbol of the church he serves, for he was appointed on that condition. But as a scholar he has complete freedom, indeed even the calling, to impart to the public all of his carefully considered and well-intentioned thoughts concerning mistaken aspects of that symbol, as well as his suggestions for the better arrangement of religious and church matters. Nothing in this can weigh on his conscience. What he teaches in consequence of his office as a servant of the church he sets out as something with regard to which he has no discretion to teach in accord with his own lights; rather, he offers it under the direction and in the name of another. He will say, "Our church teaches this or that and these are the demonstrations it uses." He thereby extracts for his congregation all practical uses from precepts to which he would not himself subscribe with complete conviction, but whose presentation he can nonetheless undertake, since it is not entirely impossible that truth lies hidden in them, and, in any case, nothing contrary to the very nature of religion is to be found in them. If he believed he could find anything of the latter sort in them, he could not in good conscience serve in his position; he would have to resign. Thus an appointed teacher's use of his reason for the sake of his congregation is merely private, because, however large the congregation is, this use is always only domestic; in this regard, as a priest, he is not free and cannot be such because he is acting under instructions from someone else. By contrast, the cleric--as a scholar who speaks through his writings to the public as such, i.e., the world--enjoys in this public use of reason an unrestricted freedom to use his own rational capacities and to speak his own mind. For that the (spiritual) guardians of a people should themselves be immature is an absurdity that would insure the perpetuation of absurdities.
然而,哪些限制阻礙了啟蒙,哪些限制非但沒有阻礙、實際上還推動了啟蒙呢?我的回答是:公開地運用自己的理性必須享有永久的自由,僅此一點就能夠在人類中間帶來啟蒙;而私下運用理性通常可能要被限制在一個狹小的範圍內,以使其不致於妨礙啟蒙運動的進步為界限。就公開運用自己的理性而言,我的理解是,任何一個人就像一個學者在全部知識介面前那樣運用自己的理性。我所說的私下運用理性,是指一個人在其社會身份或公職上受託時所運用的理性。在為了共同體利益的諸多事務中,有必要形成一套特定的社會機制,以此為依據,共同體中的部分成員必須以一種完全被動的姿態行事,通過這種人為促成的一致性,政府就可以引導他們朝向公共的目標,或者至少防止他們損害這些公共目標的實現。在這時他自然就不應去爭辯,相反他必須要服從。然而,只要社會機制的這一部分同時也把他視為全體公民社會中的一員,甚或是世界公民社會中的一員,從而能夠以一個有智識教養的學者(在其本然的正確含義上而言)的身份面對公眾時,他當然毫無疑義地能夠去爭辯,而不至於損害到他作為一員在其中被動行事並對此負有部分責任的社會機制的事務。如果一個正在服役的軍官在接到長官指令時懷疑其正當性和有效性,其結果將是災難性的。他必須服從。但是作為一個有智識教養的學者,他對軍隊事務上的錯誤進行評論或把它們提交給公眾來作判斷時,對其加以任何限制就不公正了。公民不能拒絕繳納向他徵收的稅負;事實上,對於所加稅負不恰當的指責甚至可以當作不實之毀(因為這可能會導致普遍的不服從)而加以懲處。但是,同樣的這個人,在作為一個有智識教養的學者公開表達他對於這種賦稅的不適宜性甚或不正當性的想法時,他的行動並沒有違背公民的義務。同理,一個牧師有義務依從他所服務的那個教廷的教義,向他的學生和教眾們宣教,因為他是根據這一條件才被選任的。但是作為一個有智識教養的學者他卻有充分的自由,甚或說是天職,把他經過深思熟慮並滿懷善意的對教義上的錯解的思考,還有他對於如何更好地安排宗教和教會事務的建議,傳達給公眾。在這麼做時,他不應有任何良心的重負。作為教會的一個僕人,對於因職務身份所應講授的內容,他並沒有按自己內心所見隨意處置的權利,相反,這是以他人名義、在他人指示下講授的內容。他會說,“我們的教會教導這些或那些,這些就是它所引用的證據。” 他因此能夠從那些他自己也並未完全信服、卻還是能擔負起宣講職責的戒律中,為其教眾抽取出具有實際意義的內容來,因為真理就隱藏在其中並非完全不可能,而且在任何一種情況下,其中都不存在與宗教內在本質相矛盾的地方。假如他相信能在這些戒律中發現矛盾,他就不能保持良心的安寧繼續待在這個職位上;他將不得不辭職。因此一個受委任的宣教士在其教眾面前運用理性就純屬於私下運用理性,因為無論教眾有多少人,理性的運用都只限於家庭式的聚會。就這個意義而言,作為牧師,他是不自由的而且當他在他人的指示下行事時是不可能自由的。與此相對的,一個牧師——當其作為一個有智識教養的學者以他的著述面向公眾、面向世界宣講之時——享受著無限的自由公開地去運用他的理性並以他自己的心智去表白。如果一個民族(精神事務)的監護者們自身尚處於不成熟狀態,那就成荒謬了,是那種由荒謬導向荒謬的無休止的迴圈。
But would a society of pastors, perhaps a church assembly or venerable presbytery (as those among the Dutch call themselves), not be justified in binding itself by oath to a certain unalterable symbol in order to secure a constant guardianship over each of its members and through them over the people, and this for all time: I say that this is wholly impossible. Such a contract, whose intention is to preclude forever all further enlightenment of the human race, is absolutely null and void, even if it should be ratified by the supreme power, by parliaments, and by the most solemn peace treaties. One age cannot bind itself, and thus conspire, to place a succeeding one in a condition whereby it would be impossible for the later age to expand its knowledge (particularly where it is so very important), to rid itself of errors,and generally to increase its enlightenment. That would be a crime against human nature, whose essential destiny lies precisely in such progress; subsequent generations are thus completely justified in dismissing such agreements as unauthorized and criminal.
但是,一個牧師團體,或是一個宗教會議或是令人敬畏的長老會(如同荷蘭人在其中間自稱的那樣),通過宣誓形成對一種特定的不可更改的信條的義務、以期對它的每一個成員、並通過這些成員進而對其全體人民享有千秋萬代綿延不斷的永續監護權,這樣做是否有其正當性呢?我說,這是完全不可能的。這樣的一份旨在把人類所有進一步的啟蒙都預先封死的契約,即使它受到了最高權利的認可,受到國會的認可,受到了最莊嚴神聖的和平條約的認可,依然是絕對空洞和無效的。一個時代決不能使自己背負這樣的義務,因而也是一種陰謀,竟使得後來的時代無法擴展自己時代的知識(尤其在其十分迫切需要的地方)、無法清除自身的錯誤,從而在廣義上增進啟蒙。那將是有違人性的犯罪,因為人性的最根本的目標恰恰就在於這種進步;後世的人們因而有完全的正當性拋開那些毫無權利依據並且是犯罪行為的協議條規。
The criterion of everything that can be agreed upon as a law by a people lies in this question: Can a people impose such a law on itself? Now it might be possible, in anticipation of a better state of affairs, to introduce a provisional order for a specific, short time, all the while giving all citizens, especially clergy, in their role as scholars, the freedom to comment publicly, i.e., in writing, on the present institution's shortcomings. The provisional order might last until insight into the nature of these matters had become so widespread and obvious that the combined (if not unanimous) voices of the populace could propose to the crown that it take under its protection those congregations that, in accord with their newly gained insight, had organized themselves under altered religious institutions, but without interfering with those wishing to allow matters to remain as before. However, it is absolutely forbidden that they unite into a religious organization that nobody may for the duration of a man's lifetime publicly question, for so do-ing would deny, render fruitless, and make detrimental to succeeding generations an era in man's progress toward improvement. A man may put off enlightenment with regard to what he ought to know, though only for a short time and for his own person; but to renounce it for himself, or, even more, for subsequent generations, is to violate and trample man's divine rights underfoot.
凡是可由一個民族經共識並以法律形式予以確認的每一件事務,其檢驗標準存在於這樣的一個問題中:這個民族是否可以把這樣的一種法律施加於其自身?為期待一種更好的事態,在一個特定的、短暫的時期內現在或許可以引入一種臨時性的秩序,即對於所有的公民,尤其是牧師,在其作為一個有智識教養的學者的意義上,給予公開評論的自由,如通過寫作,來揭示現行制度的弊病。這種臨時性的秩序可能要一直持續下去,直到對於這類事情本質的洞見已被廣泛傳播並變得顯而易見,因而公眾的集體的呼聲(即使不是完全一致的話)已經可以向王位提出建議,要求把他們那些教眾置於符合他們自己對更佳構想的見解的、變革後的宗教組織的監護下,同時卻不妨礙到那些仍願意象先前一樣留存在舊制度中的教眾們。但是,當他們聯合成為一個人終其一生都無法對其公開質疑的宗教組織時,這是絕對應當加以禁止的,因為這麼做,將否認、阻礙並損害後來的時代朝向人類進步的目標邁進。一個人也許會推遲對自己本應加以認識的事物的啟蒙,當然僅限於在一個較短的時間內而且只針對於他本人;但公然放棄對他自己的啟蒙,甚或讓後一世代的人們也放棄啟蒙,那就是違反並且踐踏人類的神聖權利了。
And what a people may not decree for itself may still less be imposed on it by a monarch, for his lawgiving authority rests on his unification of the people's collective will in his own. If he only sees to it that all genuine or purported improvement is consonant with civil order, he can allow his subjects to do what they find necessary to their spiritual well-being, which is not his affair. However, he must prevent anyone from forcibly interfering with another's working as best he can to determine and promote his well-being. It detracts from his own majesty when he interferes in these matters, since the writings in which his subjects attempt to clarify their insights lend value to his conception of governance. This holds whether he acts from his own highest insight--whereby he calls upon himself the reproach, "Caesar non eat supra grammaticos."'--as well as, indeed even more, when he despoils his highest authority by supporting the spiritual despotism of some tyrants in his state over his other subjects.
一個民族對自己都不可能頒佈的法令,一個君主就更不能夠強加於她了,因為君主的立法權威是以他把全體民眾的集體意願統一到他自己的意願中作為基礎的。只要他注意確保一切真正的或宣稱的改善都與社會秩序和諧一致,他就可以放手讓他的臣民們自己去做那些讓靈魂得救所必不可少的事,這些與他無干。然而,他必須盡力阻止任何人以強力妨礙其他人盡其所能地決定和增進其自身的福祉。干預這種事務有損他的尊嚴,因為他的臣民藉以闡明他們自己觀點的那些著作有助於他評估自己的治理。當他憑藉自己的至高智識去行事,卻為自己招致 “凱撒並不高於文法學家”的責難之時;或者更有甚者,當他把自己的無上權力降低到竟至於去支持國內一些暴君對他的其他臣民實行精神專制的時候,那就更為不堪了。
If it is now asked, "Do we presently live in an enlightened age?" the answer is, "No, but we do live in an age of enlightenment." As matters now stand, a great deal is still lacking in order for men as a whole to be, or even to put themselves into a position to be able without external guidance to apply understanding confidently to religious issues. But we do have clear indications that the way is now being opened for men to proceed freely in this direction and that the obstacles to general enlightenment--to their release from their self-imposed immaturity--are gradually diminishing. In this regard, this age is the age of enlightenment, the century of Frederick.
如果現在被問及,“我們當前是否生活在一個啟蒙後的時代?” 回答是,“不是,但我們的的確確是生活在一個啟蒙的時代。” 目前的情形表明,要讓全體民眾無需外部教導就能夠在宗教事務上自信地運用自己的理智,甚或說是將他們自己擺放到這樣的一個位置中去,這一目標的實現也仍存在巨大的缺失。不過我們的確看見明白無誤的徵兆,人類朝向這一目標自由前行的道路已被開啟,通向廣泛意義上的啟蒙的那些阻礙——那些從自我造成的不成熟狀態中解脫出來的阻礙——正在逐漸減少。在這個意義上,這個時代乃是啟蒙的時代,一個腓德烈的世紀。
A prince who does not find it beneath him to say that he takes it to be his duty to prescribe nothing, but rather to allow men complete freedom in religious matters--who thereby renounces the arrogant title of tolerance--is himself enlightened and deserves to be praised by a grateful present and by posterity as the first, at least where the government is concerned, to release the human race from immaturity and to leave everyone free to use his own reason in all matters of conscience. Under his rule, venerable pastors, in their role as scholars and without prejudice to their official duties, may freely and openly set out for the world's scrutiny their judgments and views, even where these occasionally differ from the accepted symbol. Still greater freedom is afforded to those who are not restricted by an official post. This spirit of freedom is expanding even where it must struggle against the external obstacles of governments that misunderstand their own function. Such governments are illuminated by the example that the existence of freedom need not give cause for the least concern regarding public order and harmony in the commonwealth. If only they refrain from inventing artifices to keep themselves in it, men will gradually raise themselves from barbarism.
一個君主如果不認為這樣的觀點與其身份不符—— 即他認為自己的義務不是去規定任何東西,而是在宗教事務上給予人們完全的自由,並因此拒絕使用寬容這樣一個傲慢的稱謂—— 那麼這位君主本身就已經是受啟蒙洗禮了的,作為將人類從不成熟的狀態中解救出來並且讓每一個人在所有精神事務上都有運用其理性的自由的第一人,或者至少就政權方面而言的第一人,被心懷感激的現世和後世的人們所讚頌。在他的治理下,受人尊敬的牧師們,可以以一個有智識教養的學者的身份,自由地並且公開地把他們自己的各種判斷和見解提交給全體公眾來檢驗,而這麼做又無損於他們自己的職責,即使這些判斷和見解在這裡或那裡偏離了既定教義。至於那些不承擔任何公職的人,那就更為自由了。這種自由精神也在向外擴展,甚至擴展到與誤解了其自身職能的政權這一外部阻礙發生鬥爭衝突的地步。它向這種政權啟示了一種範例,即自由的存在並非完全無視公共秩序和共同體的和諧一致。只要他們不再處心積慮地讓民眾停留在野蠻狀態,民眾自己將會逐漸從野蠻狀態中走出來。
I have focused on religious matters in setting out my main point concerning enlightenment, i.e., man's emergence from self-imposed immaturity, first because our rulers have no interest in assuming the role of their subjects' guardians with respect to the arts and sciences, and secondly because that form of immaturity is both the most pernicious and disgraceful of all. But the manner of thinking of a head of state who favors religious enlightenment goes even further, for he realizes that there is no danger to his legislation in allowing his subjects to use reason publicly and to set before the world their thoughts concerning better formulations of his laws, even if this involves frank criticism of legislation currently in effect. We have before us a shining example, with respect to which no monarch surpasses the one whom we honor.
我在論述啟蒙運動的主要觀點時把焦點放在了宗教事務上,即人類從自我造成的不成熟狀態中之解脫,其原因首先就在於我們的統治者並無興趣在藝術和科學方面對他們的臣民盡到監護之責,其次則因為這一不成熟狀態既是最有害的也是最可恥的。但是,一個支持宗教啟蒙的國家元首其思想氣度要比這更進一步,因為他意識到,允許他的臣民公開地運用他們自己的理性、並向世界公開展示他們關於更好立法的思想並不會威脅到他的法統,即使這會帶來對現行法律的坦誠批評。在我們面前矗立著一個光輝的典範,我們尊敬的這位君主[注:腓德烈大王],沒有任何一個君主可以超越他了。
But only a ruler who is himself enlightened and has no dread of shadows, yet who likewise has a well-disciplined, numerous army to guarantee public peace, can say what no republic may dare, namely: "Argue as much as you want and about what you want, but obey!" Here as elsewhere, when things are considered in broad perspective, a strange, unexpected pattern in human affairs reveals itself, one in which almost everything is paradoxical. A greater degree of civil freedom seems advantageous to a people's spiritual freedom; yet the former established impassable boundaries for the latter; conversely, a lesser degree of civil freedom provides enough room for all fully to expand their abilities. Thus, once nature has removed the hard shell from this kernel for which she has most fondly cared, namely, the inclination to and vocation for free thinking, the kernel gradually reacts on a people's mentality (whereby they become increasingly able to act freely), and it finally even influences the principles of government, which finds that it can profit by treating men, who are now more than machines, in accord with their dignity.
但是,一個君主,只有當其本人已經受啟蒙洗禮,不懼怕幽靈,同時手中又握有人數眾多、號令嚴明的軍隊來確保公眾和平,他才能夠說出沒有一個共和政權膽敢去講的話,那就是,“隨你所願儘管去爭辯吧,爭什麼都可以,但必須服從!” 在這裡,也如同在其他任何事務上一樣,當我們以一個寬廣的視野考察事務之時,一個奇怪的、未曾預想到的人類社會行為模式就開始顯現出自身來,在其中幾乎每一件事情均存在自相矛盾的兩面性。更大程度上的公民自由看上去要比一個民族的精神自由更有優勢,然而前者卻也為後者設下不可逾越的界限;相反,更少程度的公民自由卻為全體民眾充分發展他們的心智慧力提供了足夠的空間。因而,一旦當自然剝除那堅硬的外殼、打開在她悉心呵護下的果核之時,亦即開啟對自由思想的嚮往和召喚之時,這枚思想的果核也將漸漸地反作用於一個民族的心智(借此他們變得越來越有能力去自由地行動),最終它甚至會對政權的原則產生影響,使之發現,按照人的尊嚴對待那些已經不再是機器的人,也會使其自身受益。
I. Kant
伊曼努爾‧康德,
Konigsberg in Prussia, 30 September 1784
1784年9月30日,于普魯士哥尼斯堡
我覺得這篇真的講得很有道理,康德提供我們對於學習和生命等應有的態度。
現在社會相較於以前,在思想方面的限制已經少了很多。
但是許多現代人,還是安於把自己困在安逸的思想牢籠裡,不願成熟面對自己的思想和人生,而是一味地把人生或思想的主導權交給他人,只因為自己過於懶散而規避自己的責任。
"Dare to know!"是我們對於學習和人生應有的態度,我們應有自己的立場、培養獨立和理性思考的能力,且應試著自己去發掘和了解知識,而不是完全地仰賴權威等。
對自己的人生負責、培養獨立的人格,這是我們的責任,也是社會進步的動力。
我們應該理解真正的"enlightenment",而不是盲目的跟從主流,這是每個人都應學習的課題。
現在社會相較於以前,在思想方面的限制已經少了很多。
但是許多現代人,還是安於把自己困在安逸的思想牢籠裡,不願成熟面對自己的思想和人生,而是一味地把人生或思想的主導權交給他人,只因為自己過於懶散而規避自己的責任。
"Dare to know!"是我們對於學習和人生應有的態度,我們應有自己的立場、培養獨立和理性思考的能力,且應試著自己去發掘和了解知識,而不是完全地仰賴權威等。
對自己的人生負責、培養獨立的人格,這是我們的責任,也是社會進步的動力。
我們應該理解真正的"enlightenment",而不是盲目的跟從主流,這是每個人都應學習的課題。